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ABSTRACT 
Thin capitalization rules fit in the group of the specific anti-avoidance rules 
(SAAR) which are legalised by domestic tax laws. Anti-avoidance measures 
attempt to strike down unacceptable tax avoidance practices that have taken 
place with the increasing importance of multinational firms. In contrast to local 
firms, multinational corporations can shift profits to lower taxed foreign 
locations, leading to substantial losses in tax revenue. The article presents a 
systematic review of thin capitalization rules in EU 27, summing up four most 
common approaches of thin capitalization regulation. The analysis revealed that 
the majority of countries (15) legalised the fixed ratio approach, one quater (7) 
the subjective approach and only a few (3) legalised the hidden profit 
distribution. Two of them have improved thin-cap rules to so called earning-
stripping rule. 
Key words: thin capitalization, tax revenue, anti-avoinance rules, EU, tax 
authority 
JEL: H25 
1 Introduction 
In the last few years the tax policy of the most developed countries in 
the world can be described by trend of decreasing tax rates and 
broadening of tax base for corporate income taxes. This trend has been 
explained as the reaction of national tax policies on the cross border 
capital mobility and expanding importance of multinational corporations 
(Kaserer, 2008). 
It is a well established result, both theoretically and empirically; those 
taxes play an important role in determining the capital structure of 
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the companies (Desai et al., 2004). Consequently, a multinational 
company would choose its capital structure according to differences in 
international taxation. Unlike purely national firms, multinationals are not 
restricted to external lending; they can also lend to or to borrow from 
affiliated companies and are therefore able to optimize their capital 
structure over all affiliates in order to minimize the tax burden of the whole 
company group. Especially, they can transform equity into intra-company 
loans in order to shift profits (Buettner et al., 2006). These kinds of 
operations are called tax planning activities. Tax planning is the 
procedure of restructuring business with the intention to decrease tax 
expenses or increase of tax income with the exact intention to maximize 
net present value of each business and consequently of the whole 
company (Jones, 2003). 
The tax implications of multinational corporations are the business 
decisions that decrease tax burden. Those tax planning decisions 
encourage tax authorities to defend tax revenue by initiating anti-
avoidance rules. The so called arm’s length principle has been adopted in 
the taxation of multinational companies. The principle is set out in Article 
9 of OECD Model Tax Convention and governs the prices at which 
transfers within a multinational company are set for the purposes of tax. 
The policymakers and legislators of each country intensively work on 
different kind of measures and tax systems in order to defend tax revenues 
and prevent from long-term effects that can be seen as tax competition 
(Devereux and Keuschnigg, 2009). 
The tax theory explains that the appropriate tax system should have 
two most important criteria: economic efficiency and tax neutrality 
(Kranjec, 2003). The national tax systems of corporate income taxation 
should be neutral to business decisions (Stanovnik, 1998). In global 
economy tax system neutrality is possible only at national level while 
countries are subject of the tax competition at the international level 
(Tičar, 2002). There are several reasons why the existence of multinational 
firms is thought to have an impact on national corporate tax systems.1 
2 Thin capitalization rules as anti-avoidance rule 
Corporate income tax (additionally CIT) taxes the net income (profit) 
of corporation that is computed when all the allowable tax expenses are 
                                              
1 For a survey on the taxation of multinationals firms see (Gresik, 2001). 
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deducted from allowable tax revenues. The literature defines profit as 
surplus beyond average return on capital that consists of interests, 
dividends and retained earnings. Profit would present return on capital 
from the economic point of view under the assumption that all forms of 
return on capital are treated the same way. Unfortunately, return on debt 
financing (interests) is treated different way the return on equity financing 
(dividends) are. 
Existing corporate tax systems permit the deduction of interest 
payments from the corporate tax base, whereas the equity returns to 
investors are not tax-deductible2. This asymmetric treatment of alternative 
means of financing investment offers firms a fundamental incentive to 
increase their reliance on debt finance (Haufler and Runkel, 2008). Debt 
financing has one important advantage under the corporate income tax. 
The interests that the company pays are tax-deductible expenses while 
dividends and retained earnings are not. Thus the return to bondholders 
escapes taxation at the corporate level. 
The amount of savings on income tax due to the interest is called 
interest tax shield. This means that company for every euro paid in the 
form of interest rather than in the form of dividends, saves the amount of 
interest multiplied by the corporate income tax rate. 
Interest tax shield = rd x (M) x (t) 
r = interest rate on debt financing 
M = amount of debt 
t = income tax rate 
d = interest period 
As we can see from the Table 1, if a company pays out or charges 
interests (debt) it reduces the tax base (profits) and consequently the 
income tax liability. In doing so, the company generates gains, which can 
be seen as lower costs or tax liability. For example, in-depth analysis 
below presents an enterprise operating in the country with 35% income 
tax rate evaluating two financial plans. The company A is financed entirely 
by equity, while company B has a $ 1000.00 debt, whose cost is 8%. 
                                              
2 The financial theory explains two way of financing: 
a) equity financing (stocks, shares etc.) 
b) debt financing (loans, bonds etc.) 
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Table 1: The tax deductibility of interests increases the total income that can be 
paid out to bondholders and stockholders 
Statements 
Income statements of 
Company A 
Income statements of 
Company B 
Earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) 
1.000 1.000 
Interests paid to bondholders 0 80 
Pre-tax income 1.000 920 
Corporate income tax (35%) 350 322 
Net income to stockholders  650 598 
Total income to both (bondholders 
and stockholders) 
0+650=650 80+598=678 
Interest tax shield (35% X interest) 0 28 
Source: Brealy & Myers, 2003, p. 490 
Analysis of this case highlights two main issues in particular, namely 
shareholders and bondholders in company B reach a larger scale of cash 
flow and in the case of increasing the proportion of debt financing 
compared to equity financing the corporate income tax liability reduces. 
The difference in the tax burden derives from the fact that interest is tax 
deductible expense, while dividends and detained or non-distributed 
profits are not recognized as such. 
Because of these positive tax effects of interests, companies prefer 
debt financing method, which generates tax shield, as we have seen. 
While on the other hand, too excessive debt financing may possibly lead 
to financial difficulties and ultimately result in bankruptcy, generating the 
so-called effect of bankruptcy costs. Companies, which are financed 
mainly by foreign capital, are faced with more uncertainty compared to 
companies financed predominantly by equity capital. In the absence of 
thin capitalization institute the owners of capital are encouraged to 
preferably lend resources (a loan) as opposed to investing in capital. In 
this case, owners will be paid interests taxed by the personal tax, while in 
the first case owners would be subjected to double taxation. 
The preferred debt financing is the tax planning activity with clear 
purpose of tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is any lawful behaviour 
designed to avoid tax (McLeod, 2000). Tax avoidance transactions tend 
to have at least one of a number of features that make them identifiable. 
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Formal legality, the abuse of statutory loopholes, artificiality, and minimal 
economic purpose (other than the reduction of tax) are the recurring 
features of schemes that are seen as instances of tax avoidance (Orow, 
2000). 
Anti-avoidance measures attempt to strike down unacceptable tax 
avoidance practices. Tax avoidance, or tax shelters, is a pervasive 
problem in most of systems. Taxpayers have strong incentives to structure 
transactions to take advantage of inconsistencies or gaps in the tax rules 
to reduce their tax liabilities. Virtually all methods of taxation face this 
problem – inevitably the rules defining the tax base have holes or 
inconsistencies that can be exploited (Weisbach, 2002). Anti-avoidance 
measure can be divided into: 
• measures based on general principles in the law which are not 
codified in the legislation but are included in philosophies and 
approaches in law ("substance over form", "abuse of law"), 
• general anti avoidance rules which have the same meaning as 
"anti avoidance rules based on general principles in law" except 
that it is codified and included in the legislation 
• specific anti avoidance rules which apply to the specific situations; 
like (CFC – Controlled Foreign Companies, FPI’s – Foreign 
Portfolio Investments, Thin capitalization rules – TCR, Anti-tax 
haven rules, Transfer pricing). 
Typically, high taxing countries try to restrict inter-company loans by 
imposing the so-called thin capitalization rules or earning stripping rules 
in order to limit adverse revenue consequences (Overesch & Wamser, 
2006). While debt financing of the parent companies is the preferred way 
of financing subsidiary companies because of the tax shield, policymakers 
invented different regulations to prevent tax avoidance in different 
tax systems3. Those regulations are called thin capitalization rules and 
                                              
3 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) published its decision in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case 
on 12 December 2002. The case concerned a German taxpayer, Lankhorst-Hohorst 
GmbH, that incurred interest expenses to a Dutch related party (grandparent) on debt in 
excess of the German safe haven debt-to-equity ratios. Following the disallowance of the 
expenses by the tax authorities, the case was referred to the ECJ to determine whether the 
German thin capitalisation provision discriminated against foreign (EU)-owned companies 
in violation of the EC Treaty. The ECJ confirmed the taxpayer’s decision, concluding that 
the German thin capitalisation provision indeed infringed on the EU parent entities’ 
freedom of establishment, as it was mainly targeted at foreign-owned companies. 
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represent the name given to a particular type of international tax 
planning. Companies that need to fund parent or subsidiary companies in 
the other jurisdictions often find it more tax-efficient to fund those 
subsidiaries with shareholder debt, rather than with equity. The interest on 
loans from shareholders is deductable in the hands of the borrowing 
company, while normal dividends are not. There is therefore a tax 
advantage for a borrowing company that pays high rates of interest on 
shareholder loans instead of large dividends. Thin capitalization rules are 
regulations which limit the corporation issue shares as well as debt, 
referring to a situation in a firm or company where the higher proportion 
of funds is from loans and borrowings and not from equity and capital. 
There is no agreement on what constitutes thin capitalization. Two obvious 
measures are the debt/equity ratio and the ratio of interest to profits 
before tax (Maßbaum & Sureth, 2009). 
Despite the fluidity of the thin capitalization concept OECD Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital from 2008 sets up some 
ground rules and standards in Article 9 – Associated Enterprises 
considering thin capitalization and its relations to national legislation as 
well as international tax treaties. As discussed in the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs’ Report on Thin Capitalization, 4  there is interplay between tax 
treaties and domestic rules on thin capitalization relevant to the scope of 
the Article 9. The Committee considers that: 
a) the Article 9 does not prevent the application of national rules on 
thin capitalization insofar as their effect is to assimilate the profits 
of the borrowers to an amount corresponding to the profits which 
would have accrued in an arm’s length situation; 
b) the Article 9 is relevant not only in determining whether the rate of 
interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but 
also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or 
should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a 
contribution to equity capital; 
c) the application of rules designed to deal with thin capitalization 
should normally not have the effect of increasing the taxable 
profits of the relevant domestic enterprise to more than the arm’s 
                                              
4 Adopted by the Council of the OECD on 26 November 1986 and reproduced in Volume 
II of the loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention at page R(4)-1. 
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length profit, and that this principle should be followed in applying 
existing tax treaties. 
Categorization and classification of thin capitalization rules are 
conducted rather arbitrary and without regard to supranational tax 
legislation, while its implementation in practice is subsequently limited to 
few main approaches (Kaserer, 2008): 
• The subjective approach: under this approach the prevailing 
circumstances are evaluated to determine the terms and nature of 
the contribution to decide whether debt has been disguised as 
equity. The test of substance over form may be applied in this 
case. 
• The fixed ratio approach: under this approach the part of interest 
paid on loans in excess of D/E ratio may either be disallowed as it 
is or the same may be treated as dividend liable to dividend 
distribution tax. It may be noted that the disallowance of interest 
may not reduce the interest income of the creditor and he may 
have to pay tax on it by including it in his taxable income as 
interest income. 
• The hidden profit distributions: under this approach, the excess 
interest is treated as dividend and taxed accordingly. The general 
principles of transfer pricing rules (arm’s length principle) may also 
play a role in this respect. 
Besides thin capitalization rules interest deduction is regulated with 
additional approach: 
• The earning-stripping rule: under this approach tax deducted 
interest expenses are limited not only for related but also unrelated 
parties. 
3 Thin capitalization rules in EU 27 
The data analysis for the 27 EU members reveals that thin 
capitalization rules vary considerably among different countries. Anyway, 
our research outlined few models which are most common in the majority 
of EU member states. The complexity of the systems in EU 27 does not 
allow strict distinction of principles mentioned above while the majority of 
EU member states combine different approaches facilitating the 
implementation of anti-avoidance rules. Member states rather apply 
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the inherent mixture or combination of those principles according to the 
structure of their tax revenue system and tax authority tradition. 
3.1 The subjective approach 
The Table 2 offers the list of countries that have no specific thin 
capitalization rules. Generally used principle in this respect is the arm’s 
length principle. 
Table 2: The subjective approach 
State 
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Finland 
Malta 
Slovak Republic 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform, 2011. 
The reason those countries do not regulate specific thin capitalization 
rules is difficult to reveal. The majority5 of them are unattractive for foreign 
direct investors which may be the reason why policymakers have not had 
any need for protection national tax revenues. While the figuring out the 
reasons for the lack of thin capitalization regulation is not the objective of 
the article, it may be interesting for some further research. 
3.2 The fixed ratio approach 
The fixed ratio approach is the most common way of arranging the 
deduction of interests as tax expense. In the majority of countries the ratio 
presents the proportion between debt and equity. In case the debt exceeds 
a debt/equity ratio, interests calculated of the amount of loans that exceed 
maximum amount of debt are not tax-deductible expenses as far as 
corporate income tax is concerned. 
                                              
5 Average % of FDI in BDP in Estonia is 80.3 (2004–2009) according to UnctadStat, 
2010. 
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Table 3: The fixed ratio approach 
State Ratio Regulation 
Belgium 
1:1 
Applies to loans granted by individual directors, shareholders 
and non-resident corporate directors to their company. Interest 
relating to debt in excess of this ratio is recharacterized as a non-
deductible dividend. Also, the interest rate must not exceed the 
market rate. 
7:1 
Applies to debt if the creditor (resident or non-resident) is exempt 
or taxed at a reduced rate in respect of the interest paid on the 
debt. 
Bulgaria 3:1 
If the interest paid on loans taken from shareholders and third 
parties deduction of interest paid on loans taken from 
shareholders or third parties is limited to the total amount of 
interest income received by the company plus 75% of its positive 
financial result (computed without taking into account interest 
income and expenses). 
Czech 
Republic 
4:1 The ratio for banks and insurance companies is 6:1. 
Denmark 4:1 
A company can avoid the limitation on the deductibility of its 
interest expenses to the extent it substantiates that a similar loan 
relationship could exist between unrelated persons. 
The deductibility of net financing expenses is limited to a capital 
computed by applying a standard rate of 4.5% (for 2011) on the 
tax value of the company’s business assets as listed in the law. 
Expenses below approximately 2,8 million EUR (for 2011) are 
always deductible under this rule. The second limitation is based 
on annual profits: the net financing expenses may not exceed 
80% of the annual taxable profits. 
France 1,5:1 
The deductibility of interest is limited by the application of a 
cumulative three-step test: 
• This ratio is determined by comparing the loans from 
associated companies with the equity capital of the borrower; 
• The total amount of interest paid to associated companies 
exceeds 25% of its income (before taxation); 
• And the amount of interest paid to associated companies 
exceeds the amount of interest received from such associated 
companies. 
Continues on the next page 
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State Ratio Regulation 
Greece 3:1 – 
Hungary 3:1 This rule does not apply to indebtedness to financial institutions. 
Latvia 4:1 
The thin capitalization rule does not apply to interest paid: 
• on loans or borrowings from credit institutions resident in 
Latvia or elsewhere in the EEA or in a country with which 
Latvia has a tax treaty in force, from the World Bank Group, 
the Latvian state treasury, the Nordic Investment Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
European Investment Bank or the Council of Europe 
Development Bank; 
• by credit institutions or insurance companies 
• on loans from financial institutions that (i) are resident in 
Latvia, another EEA country or a country having a tax treaty in 
force with Latvia, (ii) provide borrowing or financial leasing 
services, and (iii) are under the supervision of the regulatory 
authorities of their state of residence. 
Lithuania 4:1 
This rule is not applicable if a taxpayer proves that the same loan 
could exist between unrelated parties. Financial institutions 
providing leasing services are not affected by this rule. 
Netherlands 3:1 
Excessively financed company exceeds average annual debt a 
3:1 debt/equity ratio for tax purposes and the excess is greater 
than EUR 500,000. 
Poland 3:1 – 
Romania 3:1 
Deductible interest is limited to the reference interest rate of the 
National Bank of Romania for loans denominated in Romanian 
lei and to the prescribed annual interest rate for loans 
denominated in a foreign currency (6% for 2010). Interest 
expenses that exceed these limits are not deductible. 
Portugal 2:1 
Thin capitalization rules do not apply to EU resident entities. 
Interest on excessive debt may be deducted, except where the 
borrower is a resident of a listed tax haven, if the taxpayer can 
prove that the loan conditions are comparable to those agreed 
by non-related parties in comparable transactions under the 
same circumstances. 
Slovenia 5:1 
4:1 from 2012. However, if the taxpayer proves that the excess 
loan could be granted also by a non-related entity, the thin 
capitalization rules do not apply. 
Spain 3:1 – 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform, 2011. 
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3.3 The hidden profit distributions 
The hidden profit distribution approach treats the excess interest as 
dividend and conducts taxation accordingly. Generally used principle in 
this respect is arm’s length principle. 
Table 4: The hidden profit distribution 
State Exceptions 
Austria 
The Administrative Court has certain broad and rather liberal guidelines, 
which are used to determine whether the equity for commercial purposes 
is adequate for the purpose of taxation. If the equity is inadequate, a 
portion of the indebtedness to shareholders may be regarded as the 
equivalent of shareholders’ equity. In addition, interest paid on loans that 
are regarded as "disguised capital" will be treated as hidden profit 
distribution. Such interest may not be deducted from the taxable income. 
Ireland 
Interest paid to a 75% non-resident parent or co-subsidiary is disallowed 
and deemed to be a dividend in certain cases. This does not apply to 
payments made to company’s resident in EU Member States, to 
companies resident in tax treaty countries, or to companies resident in a 
non-treaty country, provided that the payment was made in the ordinary 
course of the trade of the paying company and the company elects for the 
payment not to be treated as a dividend. In addition, subject to conditions, 
the deemed-dividend provision does not apply to payments of interest by 
banks to non-resident parent companies. 
Luxemburg 
Interest payments may be regarded as hidden profit distributions if the 
lending company is a shareholder of the borrowing company. In practice, 
the tax administration applies a debt to equity ratio of 85:15 for the 
holding of participations. 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform, 2011. 
3.4 Earning-stripping rule 
The interest stripping rule is not confined to related-party debt. Interest 
deductibility beyond a critical threshold is restricted, regardless of whether 
these interest payments are due to related or unrelated parties. 
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Table 5: Earning-stripping rule 
State Regulation 
Germany 
Interest expenses may only be deducted up to 30% of earnings before 
interest, taxes depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). If the interest 
expenses do not exceed the interest income derived by the paying 
company, they remain deductible. Generally, an additional safe haven of 
EUR 3 million is granted for excess interest expenses before the 30% 
barrier applies. Non-deductible interest expenses may be carried forward 
indefinitely. With effect from 1 January 2010, unused EBITDA must be 
carried forward for a maximum period of 5 years. 
Italy 
Interests are fully deductible up to an amount equal to interest income 
accrued in the same tax period. Any excess over that amount is deductible 
to the extent of 30% of “gross operating income” (earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization, EBITDA). The relevant items are 
those resulting from the profit and loss account of the company. For 
companies drafting their financial statements pursuant to IAS, the 
corresponding items of the profit and loss account are taken into account. 
Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform, 2011. 
4 Discussion 
The brief summary of important trends in European corporate taxation 
shows that many EU countries experienced a sharp decline in statutory tax 
rate which is known as the tax competition. The ability of multinational 
corporations to shift profits without shifting the real investments 
encouraged the tax authorities to restrict the deductibility of interest 
payments which are the preferred way of financing corporations because 
of the tax shield. To avoid higher proportion of debt relative to equity and 
mainly to protect national tax revenue, thin capitalization rules were 
tightened in many EU countries. 
Recently, the thin capitalization rules have gained new political 
attention. Despite thin capitalization rules already being in place, a new 
debate has started on how to prevent multinational firms from shifting a 
part of their local tax base from high tax to low tax states by setting up 
appropriate intra-group financial contracts. As a short term consequence, 
some states started to redesign their thin capitalization rules. The trend of 
changes referring to interest deduction or thin capitalization rules has 
been mainly in restricting the fixed ratio approach, limiting deduction up 
to a certain threshold or changing thin-capitalization rule into earning-
striping rule. 
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The most radical legislation changes have been made in Denmark, 
Germany and Italy. In 2007 Denmark extended its thin capitalization rules 
by introducing an interest stripping rule where interest payments are only 
deductible up to 80% of EBIT, regardless whether the underlying debt is 
granted by a related party. In 2008 Germany restricted the tax 
deductibility of interest payments even if the debt holder is an unrelated 
party while net interest payments are recognized as an expense in the tax 
computation up to an amount of 30 percent of EBITDA. However, this 
restriction does not apply to companies with net interest payments up to 
1.000.000 euro or companies that are not affiliated. In 2008 also Italy 
replaced its thin capitalization rule by a rule starting that interest expenses 
are tax deductible up to an amount of 30 percent of EBITDA regardless of 
whether the debt is granted by a related or unrelated party. 
The analysis of the data and all the information for some EU countries 
provides us the conclusion that countries are challenged by regulating thin 
capitalization rules. They are supposed to balance their short-term tax 
revenue goals against the need to create an attractive FDI environment. 
Denmark, Germany and Italy have modified their regulations in recent 
years as they seek to achieve both objectives. Very similar attentions can 
be observed in France, the United Kingdom and Denmark. 
In the majority of above mentioned countries the development of thin 
capitalization regulations has gone through the phase of limiting the debt-
to-equity ratio of foreign controlled corporations operating within their 
borders. It turned out to be in contrast with the foreign neutrality tax 
doctrine within EU at least what has been the reason for several changes 
and improvements within the last few years. Countries have found it 
appropriate to extend the initial debt-to-equity ratio rule on all parties; 
related and unrelated, to put the limit of interest expenses that are 
deductible without limitation or to change the rule into earning-stripping 
rule. The reason for this change is possibility of avoiding thin 
capitalization rule by substituting related debt by unrelated debt. This is 
not possible under an interest stripping rule, where the only way to prevent 
any restriction on interest deductibility is to substitute with equity. 
Discussing thin capitalization rules and anti-avoidance rules in 
general we cannot avoid Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on 
coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalization rules within the European Union. The resolution stresses 
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the fact that administrative cooperation can be of key importance in 
ensuring the effectiveness of anti-abuse measures and underlines the 
importance of member states’ assistance to each other for the purpose of 
detecting and combating abusive schemes. 
We cannot avoid pointing out the concept of CCCTB (Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base) as the present and future project of EU 
Commission lasting from 2004. After the veto of Ireland in 2008, the 
concept has not been realized as Directive, but the European Commission 
has not stopped its work. Even more, in August 2010 they have published 
the working paper (TaxudD1/CCCTB/RD\004\doc\en), prepared to 
facilitate discussion on possible rules to be included in a possible 
proposal for a CCCTB Directive. 
5 Conclusion 
The global economy has put a big pressure on national tax systems. 
With the mobility of business enterprises and capital investment taxation 
opportunities rise. The transfer pricing as a method for tax avoidance has 
been under scrutiny. This trend has been recognized with the increase in 
the adoption of specific thin capitalization rules, particularly amongst EU 
member states. 
The analyses of the specific anti-avoidance measures, thin 
capitalization rules among 27 EU member states bring us to conclusion 
that tax authorities have restricted anti-avoidance rules to defend tax 
revenues in the last couple of years. The countries choose different way to 
prevent income shifting from high to low tax countries. As discussed in the 
article, specific anti-avoidance rules are a matter of national legislation. 
Those rules are mentioned only in Commentary to Article 9 of OECD 
Model Tax Convention as far as secondary tax jurisdiction is concerned. 
The national freedom to regulate deduction of interests encouraged 
us to analyse the approaches of thin capitalization 27 EU member states 
have chosen. The data of IBFD Database analysis of 27 EU member 
states revealed that 15 member states legalized the fixed ratio approach, 
3 the hidden profit distribution, 7 the subjective approach and 2 earning-
stripping rule. The important difference between thin capitalization rules 
and interest stripping rules rests on the fact that the latter is not confined 
to related-party debt. Interest deductibility beyond a critical threshold is 
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restricted, regardless of whether these interest payments are due to related 
or unrelated parties. 
The comparison of thin capitalization regulations among above 
mentioned countries presents the trend of tightening thin capitalization 
rules. Even more, trend in EU 27 is restricting the interest deduction not 
only for related but also on unrelated countries. This trend means 
movement from thin capitalization rule to earning-stripping rule. 
Although thin capitalization rules and earning striping rules are 
theoretically suitable to get higher tax revenues, it is unclear whether 
governments can effectively limit inter-company debt shifting. 
Nevertheless, restricting those rules may create new obstacles to the free 
movement of capital in the EU. 
It would be very interesting to research the connection between thin 
capitalization restriction and CIT tax rate in the future. 
MSc. Tatjana Ðukić graduated at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of 
Economics in 2000 and finished her master’s studies at the University of 
Maribor, Faculty of Law in 2007. After working eight years in practice as a 
tax consultant, she continued her career at the University of Ljubljana, 
Faculty of Administration. She is assistant in the field of Economics in 
public administration and active member of Chamber of Tax Advisers. 
Throughout her work she has been involved in various projects and 
research work, and collaborating in a number of research groups 
concerning economics in public administration. Her research interests 
include public finance, taxes, macroeconomics. 
  
Tatjana Ðukić 
Thin Capitalization Rules in EU Member States 
98 Uprava, letnik IX, 2/2011 
Literatura in viri 
• Brealy, R. A. & Myers S. C. (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
• Buettner, T., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U. & Wamser, G. (2006). Taxation 
and Capital Structure Choice-Evidence from a Panel of Geman 
Multinationals. Munich: ZEW. 
• Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the Controlled 
Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin capitalization rules within the European 
Union, 2010/C 156/01 (2010). Bruxelles: European Commission. 
• Desai, M. A., Foley, C. F. & Hines, J. R. (2004). A multinational perspective 
on capital structure chice and internal capital markets. The Journal of 
Finance, 59, 2451–2487. 
• Devereux, M. P. & Keuschnigg, C. (2009). The Distorting arm’s length 
principle. Working Paper 09/1. 
• Anti-abuse rules in the CCCTB, Workshop on the Common Consolidated 
Tax Base (CCCTB), TaxudD1/CCCTB/RD\004\doc\en, 20th October 2010. 
Bruxelles: European Commission. 
• Gresik, T. (2001). The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 39, 800–838. 
• Haufler, A. & Marco R. (2008). Firms financial choice and thin capitalization 
rules under corporate tax competition. Oxford: Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation. 
• Haufler, A. & Schjelderup, G. (2000). Corporate Tax System and Cross 
Country Profit Shifting. Oxford Economic Papers, 52, 306–325. 
• Huizinga, H. & Nielsen, S. B. (1997). Capital Income and Profit Taxation 
with Foreign Ownership of Firms. Journal of International Economics, 42, 
149–165. 
• Jones, S. M. (2003). Principles of Taxation and Investment Planning. New 
York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
• Kaserer, C. (2008). Restricting Interest Deductions in Corporate Tax Systems: 
its Impact on Investment Decisions and Capital Markets. Munich: CEFS. 
• Maßbaum, A. & Sureth, C. (2009). Thin Capitalization Rules and 
Enterpreneurial Capital Structure Decisions. Official Open Access Journal of 
VHB , 1–23. 
• McLeod, R. (2000). Tax Aviidence Revisited. NZJTLP, 103. 
Tatjana Ðukić 
Thin Capitalization Rules in EU Member States 
   Uprava, letnik IX, 2/2011 99 
• Mintz, J. & Smart, M. (2001). Income Shifting, Investment and Tax 
Competition: Theory and Evidence form Provincial Taxation in Canada. 
Munich: CESIFO. 
• OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Condensed 
version – 2008. Amsterdam: IBFD. 
• Orow, N. (2000). General Anti-Avoidence Rules: A Comparative 
International Analysis. Bristol: Jordan Publishing Ltd. 
• Overesch, M. & Wamser, G. (2006). German Inbound Investment, 
Corporate Tax Planning, and Thin-Capitalization Rules-A Difference-in-
Differences Approach. 
• Stanovnik, T. (1998). Javne finance. Ljubljana: Ekonomska fakulteta. 
• Tičar, B. (2002). Učinkovito poslovanje družb z vidika davčnega 
načrtovanja. Podjetje in delo, 1648–1660. 
  
Tatjana Ðukić 
Thin Capitalization Rules in EU Member States 
100 Uprava, letnik IX, 2/2011 
POVZETEK 
INSTITUT TANKE KAPITALIZACIJE V DRŽAVAH 
EVROPSKE UNIJE 
V večini razvitih držav bi davčno politiko v zadnjih nekaj letih lahko 
opisali kot trend zmanjševanja davčnih stopenj ter širjenja davčnih osnov. 
Takšen trend se opisuje kot reakcija nacionalnih davčnih politik na 
mednarodno mobilnost kapitala ter naraščajoči pomen mednarodnih 
podjetij, ki ga imenujemo tudi davčna konkurenca. 
Teoretična in praktična dognanja kažejo, da igrajo davki pomembno 
vlogo v določanju kapitalske strukture podjetij. Obstoječi davčni sistemi 
omogočajo zmanjševanje davčne osnove za obdavčitev davka od 
dohodkov pravnih oseb z obračunanimi obrestmi, medtem ko donosi od 
kapitala niso davčno odbitna postavka. Takšna asimetrična obravnava 
različnih možnosti financiranja spodbuja podjetja k dolžniškemu načinu 
financiranja. Dolžniško financiranje ima namreč pomembno prednost 
glede na lastniško, saj so obresti, ki jih podjetje plačuje za izposojanje 
finančnih sredstev davčno odbitna postavka pri obdavčitvi dohodkov 
(dobičkov) podjetij, medtem ko dividende in nerazdeljeni dobički niso. 
Prihranek pri plačilu davka od dohodkov pravnih oseb, ki ga podjetja 
dosegajo z izbiro zadolževanja imenujemo obrestni davčni ščit. To 
pomeni, da podjetje za vsak evro, izplačan za obresti, raje kot za 
dividende, prihrani znesek obresti pomnožen s stopnjo davka od 
dohodkov pravnih oseb. 
Navkljub dejstvu, da dolžniški način financiranja prinaša pozitivne 
davčne učinke, pa lahko na drugi strani prinese tudi številne druge težave. 
Preveč poseganja po dolžniškem financiranju lahko zapelje podjetje v 
finančne težave ter se konča celo z bankrotom, ki zopet generira stroške. 
Mednarodna podjetja izbirajo kapitalsko strukturo glede na razlike v 
mednarodnem obdavčevanju. Za razliko od domačih podjetij imajo 
mednarodna podjetja večje možnosti zunanjega zadolževanja (tudi zunaj 
meja), tako da lahko posojajo ali si izposojajo od podružnic in s tem 
optimizirajo svojo kapitalsko strukturo znotraj skupine, da bi tako 
minimizirali davčno breme celotne skupine (podjetij). Posebej ugodno 
deluje na poslovanje mednarodnih podjetij dejstvo, da namesto kapitala 
uporabljajo posojila med podjetji v skupini z namenom prenašanja 
dobičkov iz držav z visoko v države z nizko obdavčitvijo. Podjetja, še zlasti 
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pa mednarodna, imajo torej možnost, da premikajo dobičke ne da bi 
selila proizvodnjo, kar imenujemo davčno načrtovanje. 
Davčno načrtovanje so najrazličnejše oblike dejanj in postopkov 
poslovnih prilagajanj s ciljem zmanjševanja davčnih obremenitev ali 
povečanja davčnih prihodkov z natančnim namenom minimiziranja neto 
sedanje vrednosti posameznega posla in posledično celotnega podjetja. 
Tovrstni postopki davčnega načrtovanja spodbujajo davčne uprave, da 
branijo davčne prihodke z iznajdbo pravil proti davčnemu izogibanju. 
Pred leti so evropske države začele pravila tanke kapitalizacije, ki 
sodijo v skupino posebnih pravil proti davčnemu izogibanju, zaostrovati. 
Kot izogibanje višjemu razmerju dolga relativno glede na kapital, še zlasti 
pa z namenom ščitenja nacionalnih davčnih prihodkov, je bilo na ravni 
EU za obdavčevanje mednarodnih podjetij postavljeno tako imenovano 
tržno načelo. Načelo je regulirano v 9. členu Vzorčnega davčnega 
sporazuma OECD ter pokriva področje cen, po katerih se vršijo 
transakcije med mednarodnimi podjetji za namene obdavčevanja. 
Posledično pripravljajo politike ter zakonodajne službe posameznih držav 
najrazličnejše mere in davčne sisteme, s ciljem da se ubrani davčne 
prihodke in doseže dolgoročne učinke. 
V zadnjem času so pravila tanke kapitalizacije zasedla posebno mesto 
zanimanja politike. Poleg že obstoječih pravil se je začela debata o tem, 
kako preprečiti mednarodnim podjetjem, da bi prenašala dele lokalnih 
davčnih osnov iz držav z visokimi v države z nizkimi davčnimi stopnjami z 
ustvarjanjem primernih finančnih pogodb znotraj podjetij v skupini. 
Kratkoročne posledice slednjega so preoblikovanja nacionalnih pravil 
tanke kapitalizacije v nekaterih državah. Trend teh sprememb se nanaša 
zlasti na odbitke obresti ali pravila tanke kapitalizacije, ki se spreminjajo 
bodisi v zaostrovanja razmerja med dolgom in kapitalom, omejevanja 
odbitka obresti do določene meje ali spremembe pravila tanke 
kapitalizacije v t.i. "earning-striping rule". 
Analiza pravil tanke kapitalizacije med 27 državami EU pripelje do 
sklepa, da so davčne uprave zaostrile pravila tanke kapitalizacije zaradi 
zaščite davčnih prihodkov v zadnjih nekaj letih. Vsaka država po svoje se 
je borila proti premikanju dobičkov iz držav z visoko v države z nizko 
stopnjo obdavčitve, pri čemer vlada nacionalna svoboda, da vsaka 
država sama uredi možnosti odbitka obresti kot davčno priznanega 
odhodka. IBFD-jeva baza podatkov je pokazala, da med 27 državami 
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članicami EU, 15 držav regulira fiksno razmerje med dolgom in kapitalom 
(Belgija, Bolgarija, Češka, Danska, Francija, Grčija, Madžarska, Latvija, 
Litva, Nizozemska, Poljska, Romunija, Slovenija, Španija in Portugalska), 
3 uporabljajo koncept distribucije skritih dobičkov (Avstrija, Irska in 
Luksemburg) , 7 ima subjektivni pristop (Ciper, Estonija, Finska, Malta, 
Slovaška, Anglija ter Švedska), medtem ko 2 državi uporabljata t.i. 
"earning-striping rule" (Nemčija in Italija). Razlika med tanko kapitalizacijo 
in t.i. pravilom "earning striping" je v tem, da slednje ni omejeno zgolj na 
povezane osebe, temveč velja za vse. To pomeni, da so obresti kot 
davčno odbitna postavka limitirane ne glede na to ali so te obresti 
posledica izposojanja od povezane ali nepovezane osebe. 
Primerjava pravil tanke kapitalizacije v državah EU 27 izkazuje trend 
zaostrovanja pravil proti davčnemu izogibanju. Celo več, trend kaže 
omejevanje odhodka iz naslova obresti ne le za povezane, temveč celo za 
nepovezane osebe. 
Največje spremembe so se zgodile na Danskem, v Nemčiji in Italiji. V 
letu 2007 je Danska zaostrila svoja pravila tanke kapitalizacije tako, da je 
uzakonila "earning-striping rule", s čimer je omejila zgornjo mejo davčno 
priznanega odhodka iz naslova obresti na največ 80% dobičkov pred 
obrestmi in davki (EBIT), ne glede na dejstvo ali za osnovni dolg jamči 
povezana oseba. Leta 2008 je Nemčija zaostrila pravila davčnega 
odbitka obresti tudi v primerih, ko gre za dolg od nepovezane osebe, pri 
čemer so odhodki iz naslova obresti priznani do največ 1.000.000 evrov. 
Podobno je pravila tanke kapitalizacije zaostrila Italija, kjer so odhodki iz 
naslova obresti davčno odbitna postavka do zneska 30 % dobičkov pred 
obrestmi, davki in amortizacijo (EBITDA), ne glede na dejstvo, da za dolg 
jamči povezana ali nepovezana oseba. 
Rezultati analize so pokazali, da gredo izzivi na področju davčne 
politike oz. javnih sredstev za države EU 27 v smeri regulacije pravil tanke 
kapitalizacije. Treba bo namreč uskladiti cilje kratkoročnih davčnih 
prihodkov na eni ter potrebe po ustvarjanju okolja za privabljanje 
neposrednih tujih investicij na drugi strani. Spremembe na področju 
urejanja pravil proti izogibanju davkom so izkoristile Italija, Nemčija in 
Danska, ki so sistem preprečevanja izogibanju davkom zaradi dolžniškega 
financiranja spreminjale s ciljem doseganja obeh zastavljenih ciljev. 
Podobno se dogaja v Franciji, Veliki Britaniji in na Danskem. 
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V kontekstu primerjave regulacij pravil tanke kapitalizacije med 
državami EU je treba omeniti Resolucijo Sveta z dne 8. 6. 2010 o 
koordinaciji kontroliranih tujih podjetij ter pravil tanke kapitalizacije 
znotraj EU. Resolucija poudarja, da je lahko sodelovanje ključnega 
pomena pri zagotavljanju učinkovitosti pravil proti davčnemu izogibanju 
ter poudarja pomembnost medsebojne pomoči držav članic pri 
ugotavljanju in boju proti zlorabam. 
Prav tako je v kontekstu pravil proti davčnemu izogibanju treba 
omeniti tudi koncept konsolidirane davčne osnove za podjetja, ki je 
pretekli, vendar tudi prihodnji projekt evropske komisije. Navkljub vetu 
Irske k predlogu Direktive o konsolidirani davčni osnovi podjetij 
(CCCTB Directive) v letu 2008 se projekt ni zaključil. Celo več, 
avgusta 2010 je evropska komisija objavila delovno gradivo 
(TaxudD1/CCCTB/RD\004\doc\en), da bi olajšala razpravo o pravilih, ki 
naj se vključijo v predlog CCCTB Direktive. 
In končno. Navkljub dejstvu, da so pravila tanke kapitalizacije ter t.i. 
"earning-striping rule" teoretično primerna za pobiranje višjih davčnih 
prihodkov, ostaja odprto vprašanje ali lahko vlade oz. zakonodajalci 
učinkovito omejujejo premikanje dobičkov med podjetji oz. med 
državami. Odprto ostaja namreč vprašanje, ali ne pomeni zaostrovanje 
pravil proti davčnemu izogibanju oviro za prost pretok kapitala v EU.
